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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MCKAY, Circuit Judge 
 
These appeals and cross-appeals arise from a dispute 
between Plaintiff Sheet Metal Workers' International 
Association Local 19 [Union], Defendant Herre Bros., Inc., 
and a third party, Sheet Metal Contractors Association of 
Central Pennsylvania [SMCA] concerning the enforcement of 
a collective bargaining agreement. The dispute revolves 
around Herre Bros.' attempt to revoke its bargaining rights 
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in the SMCA with the intent that it would not be bound by 
a later-negotiated agreement between the SMCA and the 
Union to be effective from 1995 to 1998. The Union sued 
Herre Bros., asserting that Herre Bros. was bound to the 
1995 agreement. The district court granted summary 
judgment to the Union on that issue and, after a trial on 
damages, ordered specific performance of the 1995 
agreement. Herre Bros. appealed those rulings, arguing 
that because it had revoked its bargaining rights from the 
SMCA it could not be bound by the 1995 agreement. For a 
more detailed explanation of the facts and history of the 
entire dispute, see Sheet Metal Workers' Internat'l Ass'n 
Local 19 v. Herre Bros., Inc., No. 97-7450 (3d Cir., 
December 30, 1999). In these appeals, Herre Bros. repeats 
its previous arguments; the Union cross-appeals, arguing 
that the court erroneously measured damages by excluding 
lost wages. The threshold issue is whether these appeals 
and cross-appeals should be dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. Further explanation of the procedural posture 
of this case is necessary. 
 
In its summary judgment order filed September 16, 1996, 
the district court determined that Herre Bros. was bound to 
the 1995 collective bargaining agreement with the Union 
because its conduct after it withdrew its bargaining rights 
from the SMCA invalidated that withdrawal. See App., Vol. 
II at 256A, 266A. After a trial on damages, the district court 
filed an order on August 27, 1997, in which it granted 
judgment to the Union in the amount of $325,203.98; 
required Herre Bros. to provide the Union with an 
accounting of all hours worked by nonunion workers after 
September 27, 1996; allowed the Union to file a 
supplemental brief requesting damages to union funds 
resulting from Herre Bros.' failure to utilize union workers 
after September 27, 1996, and allowed Herre Bros. tofile a 
reply brief thereto; directed Herre Bros. to specifically 
perform the 1995 agreement between the Union and the 
SMCA until it expired in 1998; and directed the clerk of the 
court "to defer entry of judgment until the conclusion of 
this case." Attach. to Appellant's Br. (Aug. 27, 1997 Order). 
Herre Bros. timely filed a notice of appeal on September 14, 
1997. 
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In that appeal, No. 97-7450, we determined that the 
August 27 Order was not final within the meaning of 28 
U.S.C. S 1291 because it did not conclusively dispose of the 
damages issues in the case and because it deferred entry of 
judgment until a later undetermined time. We concluded, 
however, that the portion of the order directing specific 
performance was immediately appealable as an 
interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1), and we 
addressed the merits of the case, affirming the district 
court. See Sheet Metal Workers', No. 97-7450 (3d Cir., 
December 30, 1999). 
 
The appeals at issue here were filed in response to two 
district court orders entered after the August 27 Order. In 
the first, filed September 19, 1997, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 62(c), the district court granted Herre Bros.' motion to 
stay pending appeal the portion of the August 27 Order 
directing specific performance. See App., Vol. I at 13A. The 
court also attempted to amend both the September 16, 
1996 summary judgment order and the August 27 Order by 
directing that judgment in the case would be entered on 
September 19, 1997. See id. 
 
Second, on September 23, 1997, the district courtfiled 
another order in which it corrected clerical errors contained 
in the judgment that was filed pursuant to the September 
19 Order. Otherwise the substance of the September 19 
and September 23 Orders is identical. 
 
Apparently in an effort to protect their rights of appeal, 
Herre Bros. filed notices of appeal and the Unionfiled 
notices of its cross-appeals from both the September 19 
and September 23 Orders. The parties phrased their 
notices of appeal and cross-appeal as though the 
September 19 and September 23 Orders are final 
judgments. Because the appeals that are the subject of this 
decision essentially mirror the appeal in No. 97-7450 over 
which we possessed jurisdiction, our decision in No. 97- 
7450 conclusively answers the issues raised in these 
appeals, with the exception of the issue of damages raised 
in the Union's cross-appeals. Accordingly, we still must 
determine whether the September 19 and September 23 
Orders provide this court with jurisdiction over the 
remaining damages issue on cross-appeal. 
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It is well established that "[t]he filing of a notice of appeal 
. . . confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests 
the district court of its control over those aspects of the 
case involved in the appeal." Griggs v. Provident Consumer 
Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982).1  Likewise, a notice of 
appeal from an unappealable order does not deprive the 
district court of jurisdiction. See United States v. Rodgers, 
101 F.3d 247, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1996); Ruby v. Secretary of 
United States Navy, 365 F.2d 385, 389 (9th Cir. 1966). 
Exceptions to the rule in Griggs allow the district court to 
retain jurisdiction to issue orders staying, modifying, or 
granting injunctive relief, to review applications for 
attorney's fees, to direct the filing of supersedeas bonds, to 
correct clerical mistakes, and to issue orders affecting the 
record on appeal and the granting or vacating of bail. See 
Bensalem Township v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 
38 F.3d 1303, 1314 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1994) (describing some 
exceptions to general rule); Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. 
Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 1988) (same); see also Fed. 
R. App. P. 7-11; Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a); Gillis v. Hoechst 
Celanese Corp., 4 F.3d 1137, 1139 n.1 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(holding that appellant was not required to file second 
notice of appeal from order making corrections of clerical 
nature to final order); Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc. v. 
Covered Bridge Condo. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 711, 713 (11th Cir. 
1990) (delineating exceptions such as the "authority to act 
in aid of the appeal, to correct clerical mistakes or to aid in 
the execution of a judgment that has not been 
superseded"). 
 
In light of these principles and because the August 27, 
1997 Order was properly appealable as an interlocutory 
order under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1), the district court did 
not have jurisdiction to enter the September 19, 1997 
Order, except for the portion of the order staying specific 
performance.2 To the extent that it granted a stay pending 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) was amended effective December 1, 1993, to 
allow a premature notice of appeal to become effective upon the denial 
of a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. See Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 
F.3d 581, 587 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
2. The court also properly stayed the portion of the August 27 Order that 
directed an accounting and supplemental briefing on damages. 
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appeal, the September 19 Order is valid. The remainder of 
the September 19 Order, however, is void for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
 837<!>Although the district court's September 23 Order 
 
appeared only to correct a clerical mistake in its September 
19 Order, which it generally would retain jurisdiction to do, 
see Gillis, 4 F.3d at 1139 n.1, the September 23 Order is 
void for the same reasons as the void September 19 Order. 
 
As a result, there is no final judgment from which these 
appeals and cross appeals are taken, and we DISMISS both 
appeals and cross-appeals in these cases for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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